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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last fifty years municipalities across Europe have faced di↵erent economic and gov-
ernment budget challenges that put pressure on their performances in terms of e ciency,
e↵ectiveness and quality of public services. On the one hand, the demand for the provision
of public goods has registered a general increase. Citizens are more conscious and demand
a wider and more skilled set of public goods, together with greater level of accountability
than in the past. On the other hand, the fulfilment of the EU fiscal discipline on public
finance requirements, imposed by central governments to local governments, has led mu-
nicipalities to reduce their expenditures (Bell & Warner, 2015). Therefore, municipalities -
especially small ones - might find di cult to meet the demands of standard levels of local
public goods while reducing their expenditure. Indeed, their territorial scale is too small to
e ciently provide high standard level of public services (Hulst et al., 2009). To deal with
these issues, central governments are experiencing institutional tools, such as amalgamation
of municipalities and inter-municipal cooperation.
Municipal amalgamation is very di↵erent from inter-municipal cooperation, and aims to
reduce the number of units of sub-national governments, by compulsory merging neighbour-
ing borders and creating new entities. The objective of municipal amalgamation is to achieve
e ciency gains, from both the exploitation of economies of scale, since a larger area can be
served after the coordination agreements, and the internalization of externalities (Oates,
1972; Case et al., 1993). However, the municipal amalgamation is di cult to achieve be-
cause of the strong opposition of local policy-makers, who may have to renounce to their
decision-making powers (Mello & Lago-Penas, 2013).
An alternative tool to the amalgamation process is the inter-municipal cooperation, a
governance structure where municipalities reciprocally cooperate in order to provide a wide
range of public services or organize service delivery between partners. Within this frame-
work, the degree of institutionalization and the extent of decision-making powers are key
elements (van Montfort & Hulst, 2011). In fact, municipalities can transfer some public
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services to a standing organization, which would be a new entity along with the cooperating
municipalities. Thus, municipalities enter into a formal agreement to co-operate with the
standing organization without, however, being replaced by it.
The literature (Dollery et al., 2006; Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Mello & Lago-Penas, 2013;
Blaeschke, 2014) has shown that the inter-municipal cooperation is a more flexible solution
than amalgamation. Municipalities can maintain, on their own territory, local political rep-
resentatives and decision power on fiscal policy. Moreover, inter-municipal cooperation can
avoid the common pool problem1, typical of municipal amalgamation. Several empirical pa-
pers show, indeed, that free-riding incentives occur among municipalities before the process
of amalgamation. In particular, Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2010) exploit two
di↵erent Swedish reforms, which impose local governments to merge, and demonstrate that
municipalities have an incentive to accumulate debt before a merger takes place. Hansen
(2014) analyzes the 2007 Danish municipal merger reform, showing that current expendi-
tures and budget overrun before amalgamation. Yet, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015), using
Finnish data, find that municipalities before amalgamation shift part of the costs of addi-
tional expenditures to the future partners, by increasing debt or liquidating assets. Similar
findings are reported by Fritz and Feld (2015), who observe higher debt dynamics for a sam-
ple of amalgamated German municipalities. They also show that debt dynamics are higher
if the number of amalgamated municipalities increases, and if municipalities are forced to
merge.2
Most empirical works have focused on the determinants of the inter-municipal coopera-
tion. In particular, relevant factors in favour of inter-municipal cooperation appear to be the
size of municipalities (Brasington, 2003; Carr et al., 2007), regional characteristics (Feiock,
2007; LeRoux & Carr, 2007), geographic factors (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Post, 2002),
1Weingast et al. (1981) shows that ine ciency, total spending and free-riding incentives tend to increase
with the number of districts (the so-called “law of 1/n”), thus reflecting the fact that when local jurisdictions
are to be merged common pool problems are likely to occur.
2Kauder (2016) also studies German municipal mergers, focusing on the population growth in merged
municipalities. By employing propensity score matching techniques, he finds that the population of small
incorporated municipalities grew faster than the population of small independent municipalities.
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fiscal revenue (Di Porto et al., 2013) and spatial proximity of municipalities (Di Porto et al.,
2016). However, few studies have analyzed the impact of inter-municipal cooperation on
socio-economic variables, focusing, instead, either on specific services (see Bel et al., 2012)
and (Brasington, 1999, 2003) for the case of solid waste services and public schooling, respec-
tively) or on a particular spending field (e.g. Allers & de Greef, 2017) use the share of tax
collection spending). Thus, to the best of our knowledge, no one has empirically explored
the ex-post local impact of inter-municipal cooperation, by considering both financial and
service outcomes.3
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature, by studying the e↵ect of inter-
municipal cooperation on local spending and on the provision of local public services. More
specifically, we investigate the Italian experience in the inter-municipal cooperation process,4
which starts in 1990 with the institution of the municipal union (Unione dei Comuni). We
use unique administrative data, that allow us to observe municipalities belonging to the
region Emilia Romagna - one of the most active Italian region in promoting inter-municipal
cooperation - over the period 2001-2011.
Our contribution is also related to the methodologies applied. Compared to the analyses
of Brasington (1999, 2003) and Bel et al. (2012), who rely on cross-sectional variations, we
are able to exploit the panel dimension of our data, more precisely the di↵erent timing in
3Instead, there is a recent strand of literature testing the e↵ect of amalgamation on municipal financial
outcomes. Reingewertz (2012), by using Israelis data, finds that amalgamated municipalities display lower
per capita expenditure after amalgamation with respect to other municipalities. The same results are found
for German (Blesse and Baskaran, 2016) and Swedish municipalities, although the results of the latter hold
only if municipalities do not exceed a critical size (Hanes, 2015). On the contrary, Moisio and Uusitalo
(2013), find that Finnish municipalities’ spending was higher in the merged municipalities, even ten years
after amalgamation. Roesel (2017) applies a synthetic control method to state-level aggregates of German
districts, finding that mergers of large local governments do not reduce per capita total expenditures and
specific per capita expenditures in categories such as social care, education or administration. Finally, Allers
and Geertsema (2016), using data on Dutch municipalities, find no significant e↵ect of amalgamation on
aggregate spending, on taxation and on the level of public services. Interestingly, in a recent paper, Lima
and Silveira Neto (2018) - by using data from Brazilian local governments - investigate the impact of the
municipal secessions on local expenditure, showing that municipalities involved in the secession process
increase the per capita capital expenditure.
4The number of municipal unions has notably increased over the time. In 2009, for example, the municipal
unions were 289, involving 1,335 municipalities (17 percent of total municipalities), while, in 2016, the
municipal unions are 537, involving 3,117 municipalities (39 percent of total municipalities).
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entering/forming municipal unions and the permanence in a Union. Furthermore, while the
existing literature has employed maximum likelihood (Brasington, 1999, 2003), probit (Bel
et al., 2012) and system-GMM estimators (Allers & de Greef, 2017) to identify the impact
of municipal cooperation on public outcomes, in our work we employ counterfactual impact
evaluation methods, such as di↵erence-in-di↵erences. Yet, to control for the di↵erent sources
of biases that may arise due to the heterogeneity of the municipalities in the sample, we
adopt parametric and non-parametric di↵erence-in-di↵erences matching models.
We find that being a member of a municipal union reduces total current per-capita ex-
penditures by around 5 percent, compared to municipalities not in a Union. We are also able
to investigate the persistence of the policy e↵ect, and we find that the expenditure reduction
is consistent and increasing up to six years after joining a municipal union. Moreover, our
results indicate that the reduction of the municipal expenditure is not driven by the size of
the municipality, and it is not related to the number of municipalities in the Union.
Our results are robust to several checks, which all point to a significant reduction of
municipal expenditures after participating to a municipal union. Our findings are also con-
firmed by repeating our main analysis using data from municipalities located in Toscana, a
neighbouring region similar to Emilia Romagna.
Finally, our dataset contains annual information at municipal level on some public service
indicators, which we use to directly test the e ciency in the provision of local services. This
is an important advantage compared to similar studies (e.g. Allers & de Greef, 2017). We
find that spending cuts are not associated with a downsizing of local services, and municipal
cooperation might (marginally) reduce local tax revenues. Overall, these results confirm that
the Union is e↵ectively increasing municipalities e ciency.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 describes the institutional background, and
Section 3 our data. Section 4 and Section 5 illustrate, respectively, empirical approach
and robustness checks. Section 6 comments our findings. Section 7 shows the results for
alternative outputs, and Section 8 concludes.
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2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Italian Constitution counts five administrative government layers: from central govern-
ment to, at local level, Regions, Provinces, Metropolitan Area and Municipalities. While
most Regions and Provinces are ruled by “ordinary” statutes, some of them – the “au-
tonomous” Regions and Provinces – are ruled by “special” statutes5. Municipalities are the
nearest jurisdiction level to the citizens, and they are in charge of several public functions
in the fields of social welfare services, territorial development, local transport, infant school
education, sports and cultural facilities, local police services, water delivery, waste disposal
and infrastructural spending.
In Italy, there are more than 8,000 municipalities and, approximately 70 percent of them
have a population lower than 5,000 inhabitants. The presence of so many small municipal-
ities has led the national government, over the last 25 years, to stimulate processes of both
amalgamation and inter-municipal cooperation. In particular, the inter-municipal cooper-
ation has formally been introduced by the Law 142/1990, which allows municipalities to
transfer their own decision-making powers, in terms of expenditure decisions, to a standing
organization called municipal union (Unione di Comuni). The Italian municipal unions can
be compared to the Mancomunidades in Spain, the Intergemeentelijke diensten in Nether-
lands, the Zweckverbande in Germany, the Sivu, Sivom, Syndicats mixtes in France and the
Opdrachthoudende & dienstverlenede verenigimgen in Belgium/Flanders.
According to the Law 142/1990, a municipal union provides the public services transferred
by the cooperating municipalities. In this framework, municipalities transfer the money re-
lated to the public function(s) they want to share, and the Union provides the corresponding
service(s). Therefore, the Union is a legal entity, with its own balance sheet, its own presi-
dent – chosen among the mayors of municipalities joining the Union – and its own council –
composed by the council members of cooperating municipalities. Moreover, the Italian law
5There are five Autonomous Regions (Sicilia and Sardegna, which are insular territories, and Valle
d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia, which are northern boundary territories) and two
Autonomous Provinces (Trento and Bolzano).
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prescribes that each municipality can be member of only one Union. A municipality can
leave a Union, according to the rules defined in its own statute, and afterward can decide to
join another Union.
In financial terms, the share of the municipal unions budget on the total expenditure of
local governments has increased over time. For example, in 2007, the total expenditures of
municipal unions accounted for about 0.10 percent (403 millions of euro) of the total local
expenditures in Italy (350 billion of euro). In 2013, the total expenditures of municipal
unions are more than doubled, accounting for about 0.30 percent (970 millions of euro)
of the total local expenditures in Italy (334 billions of euro). However, these percentages
do underestimate the real expenditure quota of the Unions, because municipalities do not
often write o↵ their quota of the delegated function, and continue to register it as their own
expenditure.
As revenues are concerned, the municipal union relies on both transfers from municipal-
ities within the Union and transfers from higher level of governments (State and regional
governments). These transfers are generally intended as a way to support Unions for all costs
related to the organization of local services in a cooperative way. It is also worth noticing
that municipal unions are exempted from the internal stability pact, a set of fiscal rules
imposed by the central government to each municipality above 5,000 inhabitants.
The functions commonly transferred to the Unions are Administration and Management,
Municipal police, Education, Roads and Transport Services, Planning and Environment and
Social welfare. Municipalities can also transfer other functions, such as Economic develop-
ment, In-house production services, Culture, Sport and Tourism.
More precisely, the main tasks within the Administration and Management function are
related to the management of the personnel, recruitment, training and definition of the legal
and economic status of the sta↵. With regards to the Municipal police function, the services
assigned to the Union concern the application of the municipal regulations, road safety, pro-
tection of business and consumer freedom, protection of living and urban safety, rural safety,
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security and regular work, control of local tributes and civil protection. The Education ser-
vices usually associated with a municipal union are: nursery and childcare, auxiliary services
to education, teaching and training (such as, canteen, school transport, support for disabled
people), and development of educational projects. The Roads and Transport Services, and
the Planning and Environment tasks delegated to the Union include: development of urban
planning tools, maintenance of the road and tra c system, management of cadastral func-
tions, urban planning and anti-seismic vigilance and control. In addition, the Union also
carries out the preparation and the management of the Triennial Public Works Program
(Piano Triennale delle Opere Pubbliche). For the Social welfare, tasks devoted to the Union
concern measures against poverty and social inclusion, support for elderly and young people,
social services in support of disabled people, accreditation of socio-sanitary structures. Eco-
nomic development and In-House production duties delegated to the Union are: information
services, administration and management of local networks, database management and ac-
quisition, hardware and software purchase, sta↵ training and statistical services. Although
it is not very common, municipal union can also be delegated to deal with culture, sport
and tourism. Unions may be in charge of the organisation of public events, management
of libraries, museums and sport facilities, such as swimming pools and stadia. Municipal
unions may also organize local reception of tourists and information points.
Benefits from cooperation in the provision of all these services are mainly due to the
exploitation of economies of scale and the reduction in the number of tasks (unnecessarily)
undertaken by each municipality. In this way, duplication of public functions are avoided,
costs can be shared and, eventually, new public services provided. For example, the coop-
eration on the Municipal police function has allowed the introduction of the neighbourhood
policeman (poliziotto di quartiere) and the reinforcement of the night and festive police
services.6 Consequently, cooperation induces municipalities to review their procedures and
6For illustrative purpose, we collect information (from the balance sheet of each single municipality) on
the number of municipal policemen and its relative expenditure. Then, for each municipality belonging to
the municipal union, we compare the number of policemen, before and after the municipality entered the
Union. The results indicate that before entering the Union, municipalities have, on average, 7 policemen,
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operations which, in turn, may result in an increase of e ciency (Hansen et al., 2014).
Regional administrations are endowed with strong regulatory powers regarding munici-
palities belonging to Unions. In particular, regions have a prominent role in monitoring and
evaluating all the processes of municipal cooperation, in order to promptly intervene if any
issue arises.7 Regions also provide municipalities and Unions with both legal advices and
feasibility studies during the Union’s formation process. In addition, each region, through
its own law, can stimulate and promote Municipal Unions within its territory, mainly by
means of regional transfers. Some regions - such as Veneto, Toscana and Emilia Romagna
- sustained the creation of municipal unions using di↵erent financial incentives (e.g length
of permanence or size of the Union), whereas other regions did not promote any form of
support. A particular case is Lombardia, which has created a special register of municipal
unions (Unioni di Comuni Lombardi), such that only registered municipalities have access
to regional transfers.
3 DATA
As discussed in the previous section, the regional administrations regulate and implement
the municipal unions through their own laws. Consequently, the organisation process has
not been homogeneous both over space, i.e. across regions in Italy, and over time (during
the period of our analysis 2001-2011). This implies that municipalities in Unions located in
di↵erent regions are not properly comparable, and we cannot identify a unique (aggregate)
e↵ect of the policy on local expenditures.
We have therefore decided to restrict our main analysis to one region only, Emilia Ro-
magna and to consider a second region, Toscana, to assess the robustness and the general
and the level of expenditure for the municipal police service is equal to 31 euros per-capita. After entering
a Union, the number of policemen is halved (on average 3.50) and the level of expenditure for the municipal
police service reduces to 25 euros per-capita. Note that the di↵erence in the number of policemen, before
and after the entrance in the union (3.50 = 7-3.50) is statistically significant at 1 percent as well as the
di↵erence in per-capita expenditure (6=31-25).
7Most often, these issues concern the “cultural” resistance of municipalities to cooperate.
9
validity of our results. Our choice depends, first of all, on the availability of rich data on
all municipalities in Emilia Romagna. We use information resulting from a combination
of di↵erent archives publicly available from the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the Italian
Ministry of Economy and the Italian Institute of Statistic (ISTAT). Our data include a full
range of information: 1) municipal financial data, such as total current expenditures, pub-
lic debt, revenues; 2) municipal demographic and socio-economic data, such as, population
size, age, average income of inhabitants, birth rate, net migration, number of children en-
rolled at primary school ; 3) other output data, such as waste collection, road accidents and
kindergarten supply. The details on data sources are reported in Table A.1
Second, Emilia Romagna is one of the biggest and wealthiest Italian regions. It is located
in the North and its average population in the period of our analysis, 2001-2011, has been
around 4 million inhabitants (approximately 7.50 percent of the Italian population). The
average GDP, over the same period, has been 116 billion euros (approximately 9 percent of
the Italian GDP).
Third, inter-municipal cooperation is a widespread phenomenon throughout Emilia Ro-
magna. During the last decade, indeed, the number of Municipal Union has noticeably
increased, involving the greatest proportion of municipalities among ordinary status regions.
Thus we think that the e↵ect of municipal unions in this region may be a good predictor
of the overall e cacy of the policy.
3.1 Municipal unions in Emilia Romagna
In our data we can observe 348 municipalities in Emilia Romagna, for the period 2001-2011.
However, we exclude Bologna because of its specific status of Metropolitan Area, which
normally provides a much wider range of services than other municipalities. Moreover, due
to missing values in some variable of interest our final sample reduces to 335 municipalities,
or a total of 3,686 observation in the period under investigation.8
8Summary and descriptive statistics are reported in Table A.2 .
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We know the exact year of entrance of a municipality in a Union, and Figures 1 and 2
show a map of all municipalities in Emilia Romagna in 2001 and 2011, highlighting those in
a Union, while in Table 1 we report the number of municipalities in Union and not in Union,
for each year from 2001 to 2011. We notice that in 2001 (Figure 1) there is only one municipal
union, including 9 municipalities (2.67 percent of the total) and serving 20,767 inhabitants,
around 1 percent of the regional population. Figure 2 shows a completely di↵erent picture in
2011: there are 31 municipal unions involving 160 municipalities (47.06 percent of the total)
and serving 1.5 million of inhabitants, that is 34 percent of the total population of Emilia
Romagna. Focusing on Table 1, the bulk of municipalities forming and/or joining a Union
occurred between 2007 and 2009. Indeed, in 2007, 54 municipalities (16.12 percent) were in
a Union, while in 2008 the number of municipalities in a Union increased up to 70 (20.83
percent). Finally, for the years 2009 and 2010, the municipalities in Union were 132 (39.88
percent) and 150 (43.73 percent), respectively.9
PLACE FIGURE 1, FIGURE 2 AND TABLE 1 HERE
Municipal unions are composed, on average, by 5 municipalities (from a minimum of 2
to a maximum of 10) and cover an average population of approximately 43,000 inhabitants.
The Unione Valle Tidone, includes only two municipalities, and it is the smallest serving
3,096 people. The Unione Comuni Modenesi del Distretto Ceramico, is composed by 4
municipalities, and it is the largest Union serving 107,138 inhabitants.
The decision to enter a Union belongs to the single municipality, even though the regional
government has the power to regulate the process of inter-municipal cooperation. Specifi-
cally, the government of the Emilia Romagna approved in 2008 an important regional law
(LR 2008, n.10) aiming at rationalising public expenditures through a reorganisation of the
institutional bodies on its territory. Emilia Romagna transformed the mountain communities
9The trend is continuously growing and by 2016 the percentage of municipalities in unions is 81 percent.
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(an institutional organisation formed only by mountain municipalities) in municipal unions
and strongly encouraged municipalities to form Unions, giving to the latter direct financial
incentives.
As a consequence of the regional law, the total amount of regional transfers to municipal
unions immediately increased from 2 million euros in 2007 to 4.6 million euros in 2008. This
corresponds to an average increase for each municipal union from 198,759 euros to 289,779
euros.10 Transfers are attributed according to: i) the type and the number of spending
functions / services assigned to the Union; ii) demographic density, number of municipalities
and overall population of the Union and iii) sta↵ transferred to the Union.
3.2 Expenditures
We consider the total current expenditure of each municipality, in per-capita terms, as an
aggregate measure to compare the performances of municipalities in Union and not in Union.
It is important to note that the total current expenditure for municipalities in a Union
includes their transfers to the Union. Indeed, the services provided by the Unions are
essentially financed through those transfers and by direct expenditures registered in the
budget of the municipalities. However, we do not have information on the amount transferred
to the Union, disaggregated by single items of the municipality budget. This implies that
any analysis that find an e↵ect on sub-categories of expenditure would be biased.11
As a preliminary piece of evidence, it is interesting to see that the average per capita
expenditure of municipalities in Union is 751.10 euros whereas for the others is 835.99 euros.
This gives a di↵erences of 84.88 euros p.c.12 which is statistically significant at 1 percent.
10The regional transfers to municipal unions have continued to increase averaging to 314,543, 307,792 and
326,204 euros, for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively.
11Consider, for example, a municipality not in a Union that in year T spends for the police function 100
euros. Now assume that the same municipality joins a Union in year T+1 and transfers a certain amount
of money for the municipal police (say 100) and other functions now provided by the Union. Then, in
the budget of the municipality we would observe zero expenditures for the municipal police, however the
true value for this specific item of the budget would still be 100, since it would correspond to the amount
transferred from the municipality to the Union for the provision of the municipal police service.
12From now on per capita is reported as p.c.
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Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the (logs of) current expenditure p.c. for municipalities
in Union and not in Union. The trends look a bit di↵erent in the first 3 years of the sample,
however there are at most 5 Unions and 23 municipalities (see Table 1). From 2004 to 2007
the trends are similar, and afterwards they start to diverge, with an important decrease in
the expenditure of municipalities in Union after 2009. Notice that this timing corresponds
to the introduction in 2008 of the regional reform law mentioned above, which has increased
the regional transfers to Unions and it has been followed by a strong increase in their number.
PLACE FIGURE 3 HERE
4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
In this section we describe the main strategies to identify the e↵ect of being a member of a
municipal union on the spending decisions of single municipalities. Ideally, we would like to
compare decisions on expenditure for municipalities in a Union (treated group), to the same
decisions for municipalities in the counterfactual situation of not being in a Union. This
is impossible, and the best alternative would be a randomized control trial which assigns
participation and non participation in a municipal union across municipalities, and allows us
to compare the average expenditures of the two groups. In our analysis, however, we have
to rely on quasi-experimental methods to define a suitable control group that can credibly
estimate the counterfactual. The main concern on the identification using these approaches
is due to the unobservable characteristics that may vary between municipalities in Union




The first approach that we implement is a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) methodology, since
we can exploit the panel dimension of our data and attempt to remove the unobservables
that are fixed over time. For each year, we have municipalities in Unions (treated group)
and municipalities not in Unions (control group). We therefore compare the change in
expenditures in the treatment group before and after the participation in a municipal union,
to the change in expenditures in the control group for the same period.
We estimate the following two-way fixed e↵ect linear model
Yit = µi + ⌧t +  MUit +  xit + "it (1)
where Yit is log per capita expenditure in municipality i at time t, MUit is a dummy variable
that takes the value one if municipality i at time t belongs to the Municipal Union and
zero otherwise. µi are a set of municipalities fixed e↵ects, and we also control for exogenous
shocks, ⌧t, common to all municipalities in period t. xit is a vector of time-varying variables,
accounting for demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In particular, following the
literature on the determinants of local spending (Revelli, 2003; Sole`-Olle`, 2006; Veiga &
Veiga, 2007; Ferraresi et al., 2018), we include the population of the municipality (popu-
lation), the per capita area, calculated as square kilometers divided by population (area -
squared km), and the inverse of the population (1/population). These variables can capture
the presence of scale economies or dis-economies in the provision of public goods and con-
gestion e↵ects. The proportion of citizens aged between 0 and 5 (population  5) and the
proportion of citizens aged over 65 (population   65) can account for some specific public
needs (e.g., nursery school, nursing homes for the elderly). In terms of economic and finan-
cial controls, we include the average per capita income proxied by the personal income tax
base (income) and the proportion of taxpayers (taxpayers). Moreover, we define a dummy
variable (election), which, during the period 2001-2011, is equal to 1 for a given municipality
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in the year of election.13
Finally, the error term "it is assumed to be independent of µi and ⌧t, and we cluster
the standard errors at municipal level. In this framework,  , is the di↵erence-in-di↵erence
estimate of the e↵ect of being in a municipal union on expenditure.
DiD assumptions
The main assumption for the validity of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences method is the presence
of pre-treatment common trends for municipalities in both the treatment and control groups.
Figure 3 is not helpful for a visual inspection of the pre-treatment trends since we are using
treatments at di↵erent times. Therefore, we perform a formal test by re-estimating equa-
tion 1, including the interactions of the time dummies and the treatment indicator for the
first three pre-treatment periods. If the expenditure trends between treatment and control
group are the same, then the coe cients of the interactions should be not statistically sig-
nificant, i.e. the di↵erence in di↵erences is not significantly di↵erent between the two groups
in the pre-treatment period. An attractive feature of this test is that also the interaction
of the time dummies after the treatment (up to 2 years) with the treatment indicator is
informative, it can show whether the treatment e↵ect changes over time. The literature
generally refers to the interactions of the treatment indicator with the pre-treatment periods
as “leads” and the interaction with the post-treatment time dummies as “lags”.14 In our
analysis, we estimate the following version of equation 1:






 +j MUi,t+j +  xit + "it (2)
where the sum of   j allows for 2 lags e↵ects and the sum of  +j allows for 3 leads or
anticipatory e↵ects. A test of the di↵erence in di↵erences assumption is  +j = 0 for each
13Since Italian municipalities have staggered times of elections it is feasible to include, simultaneously, a
dummy variable for municipal election and annual fixed e↵ects. In this way we can distinguish the e↵ect of
being in an electoral year from other fluctuations due, for example, to changes in macroeconomic conditions.
14See Autor (2003) for an application of this method.
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j = 1, 2, 3, i.e. the coe cients of all leads of the treatment should be zero. Furthermore,   j
may not be identical and if the e↵ect of the treatment is growing over time   j increases in
j.
4.2 Propensity score matching models
The approach discussed so far might, however, su↵er of two potential sources of bias, because
the e↵ect of entering a Union is not homogeneous and varies according to the characteristics
of the municipalities. The first bias, indeed, arises when municipalities in the treatment
group are somehow di↵erent than those belonging to the the control group. The second
source of bias might be due to di↵erent distributions, within the treatment and the control
groups, in the vector of observable characteristics that a↵ect expenditures.
We attempt to eliminate these biases in the estimations by adopting propensity score
matching models. The main purpose of matching is to find a group of non-treated munic-
ipalities, who are similar to the treated in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics, x, the
only remaining di↵erence being that one group enters a Union and another group does not.
In the first stage we therefore estimate the propensity score15 using a discrete response
model of entering a municipal union. In particular, we use data from the 2001 Census and
run a probit regression, where the dependent variable is given by a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if a municipality entered in the municipal union during the period 2001-
2011 and zero otherwise. The included control variables are: a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the municipality is located in a seismic zone (seismic area), a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the municipality is a rural municipality and zero otherwise (rural area); per capita surface
in square km of the municipality (area p.c.); a categorical variable (altitude profile) equal
to 1 if the municipality is located in plain, equal to 2 if the municipality is located on hills,
and equal to 3 if the municipality is located in mountains; municipal unemployment rate
(unemployment); number of houses (dwellings); number of firms (firms). We also include
15The probability of entering a Union conditional on pre-treatment characteristics x, P (x) = Pr(MU =
1|x)
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population, population disaggregated by age and inverse population; income, taxpayers, and
a continuous variable that measures the level of municipal debt expressed in per-capita term
(debts). All these variables refer to the year 2001. The results of the estimation of the
propensity score model are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix A. Once we have obtained
the propensity score (PS), following Smith and Todd (2005), we adopt a trimming procedure
to define the common support as the region of values of PS that have positive density within
both the treatment and control groups distributions.16 We then re-estimate equation 1 by
using information only on the observations that lie on the common support.
However, within the common support, the distribution of x might be di↵erent between
treated and control observations, keeping the second source of bias. Therefore, we control














where t0 and t1 are time periods before and after entering a Union. Specifically, MU is
formed by municipalities not in municipal union in t0 that will join a Union in t1, NMU
is formed by municipalities not in municipal union in t0 that will remain out of any Union
in t1. Wij is the weight placed on the jth observation in constructing the counterfactual
for the ith treated observation. Y is the expenditure of municipalities and wi is the re-
weighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. In order to
have a balanced sample between the two comparison groups, we choose the years 2008 and
2010 as pre-treatment and pos-treatment period, respectively.
We have already mentioned the important regional reform law approved in Emilia Ro-
16In particular, following (Galiani et al., 2005), we also trim the propensity scores distribution eliminating
those municipalities with values lower than the first percentile and higher than the ninety-ninth percentile.
Overall, from the matching procedure we exclude approximately 10 percent of municipalities from our sample.
17The Kernel matching approach has been performed by using the Stata command di↵ developed by Villa
(2012). The standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
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magna in 2008, and the subsequent strong increase in the number of municipalities that
entered and/or formed a Union (this pattern is clear looking at Table 1). Hence, in the
treatment group we include only municipalities that join a municipal union in 2009, and in
the control group municipalities that never joined a Union. We then perform the matching
approach as in equation 3, by comparing expenditure between treated and control munici-
palities, in 2008 and in 2010.
4.3 Heterogeneity
To investigate whether there is evidence of heterogeneity, we observe how the e↵ect of the
policy varies with respect to the permanence in a municipal union. In fact, the model in
equation 1 does not directly take into account of the length of time spent by each municipality
in the Union after joining it. This is an important issue since we are dealing with multiple
treatment groups and multiple time periods. We, therefore, estimate a modified version of
equation 1, where we add a continuous variable that measures the permanence (permanence)
in the Union (from zero to 11 years), and we also include its quadratic term (permanence
square). We then evaluate the e↵ect of the permanence in each year, separately.
Another source of heterogeneity that may a↵ect expenditure savings is the size of the
municipalities entering the Union. Indeed, we expect a bigger e↵ect for small municipalities
joining a Union, since they can exploit higher economies of scale, compared to large mu-
nicipalities. Therefore, we build a new variable, largeit, which takes on the value of one if
the municipal population is above the average population of all municipalities in the Union
(around 8,000 inhabitants) and zero otherwise. This variable is then interacted with MUit
and we estimate the following version of equation 1:
Yit = µi + ⌧t +  MUit +  MUit ⇥ Largeit +  xit + ✏it (4)
In this case,   captures the e↵ect of being in a municipal union for small municipalities, while
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  accounts for the the di↵erential e↵ect of being in a municipal union for large municipalities.
Finally, being in a Union formed by a large number of municipalities may be more
demanding in terms of organization costs and coordination than being in a Union with a
relatively small number of municipalities. We control for the number of municipalities in
Union, by defining a new variable, Unionsizeit, which varies from a minimum of 2 to a
maximum of 10 municipalities within a given municipal union. We interact this variable
with MUit and we re-estimate the following version of equation 4:
Yit = µi + ⌧t +  MUit +  MUit ⇥ Unionsizeit +  xit + ✏it (5)
where   +  ⇥Unionsizeit is the e↵ect of being in a municipal union on expenditure, which
now depends on the number of municipalities.
We replicate all the analysis discussed to detect heterogeneity both in the full and in the
matched samples of municipalities.
5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We provide a series of tests and alternative specifications to assess whether our results are
robust, and confirm a reduction in municipality expenditures after joining a Union.
5.1 Reverse causality
The validity of our results relies on the assumption of absence of reverse causality, that is we
exclude any direct e↵ect of expenditure on the decision to join a municipal union. In order
to test this assumption we estimate the conditional probability, hit, to enter a Union for a
municipality i at time t, given that the event has not yet occurred. Following Jenkins (1995)
we specify the form of the hazard function as a complementary log-log hazard rate and we
use a piecewise-constant baseline hazard by including dummy variables for each year. Thus,
within each time interval the duration dependence is assumed constant. This represents a
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semi-parametric, discrete-time, homogenous hazard model which can be written as
hit = 1  exp(  exp(↵dit +   xit + ⌘ Yit)) (6)
where the vector xit includes all the control variables described in section 4 and annual
fixed e↵ects. Yit is the (log) expenditure. We also estimate a heterogenous hazard model,
generalising equation 6 to account for any unobserved municipality-specific e↵ect by including
a random intercept qi, which is uncorrelated with all the covariates (Narendranathan &
Stewart, 1993). Our hypothesis is that the coe cient ⌘ of log expenditures is not significant,
i.e. there is no reverse causality.
5.2 Transfers
A potential source of bias that might a↵ect our results is the omission of transfers and/or
revenue collected by the Union. Indeed, we cannot properly separate the e↵ect of being in a
municipal union from the variation in the financial resources raised by the municipal union.18
To deal with this issue, we define a set of variables capturing the amount of transfers and
revenues collected by the municipal union. In particular, we re-estimate equation 1, both
in the full and matched samples, by including 3 variables that account for the transfers to
the municipal union from: central government (state grants), regional government (regional
grants) and other bodies (other bodies grants). We also add a fourth variable that measures
the resources raised by the Union (other revenues). Since these variables change each year
only at municipal union level, all the municipalities belonging to the same Union have the
18For example, consider a municipality M that enters in year T in a municipal union. M transfers a given
amount of money, say 100 euros, to the Union. The total expenditure of M, including the transfer to the
Union, for the year T is 900+100=1,000 euros. Then, suppose that the same municipality in year T+1
transfers to the Union a lower amount of money, say 50 euro. This because in year T+1 the municipal
union has received additional transfers from the regional government. Assume that the expenditure of
municipality M, net of the transfers to the Union, is constant (900) between year T and T+1. Therefore,
the total expenditure of municipality M in year T+1 is 950 euro. If we compared the total expenditure of
municipality M, between year T and year T+1, we would observe a reduction (from 1000 to 950). However,
such a reduction, would not be due to e ciency gains resulting from the participation to the Union. On the
contrary, this would be due to the reduction in transfers from the municipality to the municipal union.
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same value.
Moreover, in order to generate some variation at municipality level within a Union, we
compute the share of all transfers and revenues for each municipality according to their
population size. We then replicate the analysis including in equation 1 this new variable
called Union revenues by municipalities.
5.3 Homogenous Control Group
We estimate our DiD model using a more homogeneous definition of the control group.
Firstly, we restrict the sample to the years 2001-2008 and we exclude municipalities that
never enter a Union (never treated). Then, we include in the control group the municipalities
that join a Union between 2009 and 2011 (future treated) together with all the municipalities
observed in the years before entrance (within the period 2001-2008). Secondly, we estimate
equation 1 in the full sample and in the matched sample of municipalities. This analysis
is important because it means that we include in the control group municipalities that are
simply further down the ‘queue’ for participation in the policy.
5.4 Alternative Region: Toscana
All the analyses performed so far have been based on a sample of municipalities located in
Emilia Romagna. However, a potential concern might be that the selection into the treat-
ment within Emilia Romagna is not completely random. Hence, we replicate our analysis
in an alternative and more comparable region. We consider Toscana, another important ad-
ministrative region located in the north of Italy and sharing a common border with Emilia
Romagna. In Toscana, over the period 2001-2011, the average population has been about 3.8
million inhabitants (approximately 6 percent of the Italian population), the average GDP
around 105 billion euros (approximately 8 percent of the Italian GDP). Likewise for Emilia
Romagna, we have collected for Toscana financial, demographic and socio-economic data
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at municipal level. Overall, we count 263 municipalities out of 276,19 leading to 2,893 ob-
servations in the period 2001-2011. Di↵erently from Emilia Romagna, the evolution of the
municipal cooperation is much less marked and starts later. According to the sources of the
Ministry of Interior, in 2009 in Toscana there were only 6 municipal unions, involving 38
municipalities. In 2010 and 2011, the number of municipal unions increased to 8, involving
48 municipalities. Therefore, using the available information we evaluate the e↵ect of join-
ing a municipal union on expenditures, estimating equation 1 on the full sample and in the
matched sample of municipalities in Toscana.
6 RESULTS
In Table 2 we show the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) estimates. In particular, in column 1
we estimate equation 1 in the full sample, including only municipality and year fixed e↵ects.
We find that being a member of a municipal union decreases the municipalities expenditures
by 6.5 percent, and the e↵ect is significant at 1 percent. One issue is that there may be
municipality characteristics varying across time and space, potentially correlated to partic-
ipation to a Union and expenditures. We therefore estimate our DiD model controlling for
a series of demographic and socio-economic factors described in Section 4.1. The inclusion
of the control variables slightly changes the magnitude of the treatment e↵ect. In fact,
looking at column 2, we notice that the coe cient of municipal union is still negative (-4.4
percent) and significant (at 1 percent), however it drops by 2.1 percentage points. This
implies that it is important to control for di↵erences among municipalities. The estimates
in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 are obtained restricting to the subsample of matched munic-
ipalities, and all confirm our previous fundings. This approach should control for the bias
arising when municipalities in the treatment group di↵er from those included in the control
group. In column 7 of Table 2 we report the results of the non-parametric DiD kernel match-
ing estimation. This methodology should take into account of possible di↵erences, between
19Unfortunately, for 13 municipalities data are not complete or missing.
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treatment and control groups, in the distribution of observable characteristics that influence
expenditures. We again find similar results to the previous estimates: being in a municipal
union reduces the expenditure by around 5.5 percent and the e↵ect is significant at 5 percent.
PLACE TABLE 2 HERE
To assess the common trend assumption, as explained in Section 4.1, we estimate equa-
tion 2 and check whether the coe cients of the leads are statistically significant. In Figure 4
we plot the point estimates and its 95 percent confidence interval, and we do not observe any
significant e↵ect of the leads up to a pre-treatment period of 3 years.20 The coe cients of
the lags, shown up to 2 years after entrance, are statistically significant and suggest that the
negative e↵ect of the municipal union on expenditure is growing over time. In Table A.5 we
report the results of the estimation using the full sample and the matched sample. Overall,
this test reassures on the validity of the common trend assumption.
PLACE FIGURE 4 HERE
6.1 Heterogeneity
As mentioned in Section 4.3, we first investigate whether the e↵ect of joining a municipal
union is a↵ected by the length of the permanence. In column 3 of Table 2 we show that
including in equation 1 a measure of permanence has a concave e↵ect, and remaining one
additional year in a Union reduces on average the expenditures by 2.8 percent. A simi-
lar e↵ect is obtained when we repeat the analysis in the matched sample (see column 6).
20In order to build the leads variables we have collected information about the participation of the single
municipality in the Municipal Union for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. For example, the lead variable for
municipality i in year 2011 implies to know whether municipality i will join a municipal union in 2012: if it
joins a Union in 2012, the value of the lead variable for the year 2011 is equal to 1, instead, if it does not,
the value of the lead variable for the year 2011 is equal to 0.
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However, to better understand the dynamic of the permanence in a Union, we have dis-
entangled the aggregate e↵ect in annual e↵ects, and reported the results in Table 3. In
practice, for any year of the permanence in the Union we compute the following combina-
tion: MU + permanence ⇥ year + permanence square ⇥ year2, where year corresponds to
the number of years for which we want to compute the e↵ect. In columns 1, we consider
the full sample, and it is interesting to observe an important reduction in expenditures after
4 years in a Union (from -4 percent to -6.9 percent). The e↵ect is highly significant and
increasing up to 6 years from the entrance in a municipal union. It slowly decreases after 7
years and then disappears. Similar results are observed in the matched sample (column 2),
although with a slightly smaller magnitude.
PLACE TABLE 3 HERE
Besides the permanence, we test whether the size of the single municipalities a↵ects the
e↵ect of being in a municipal union. In columns 1 and 3 of Table 4, we report the estimates
of equation 4 in the full and the matched samples, respectively. In column 1, we notice a
negative e↵ect (-3.4 percent), statistically significant at 5 percent, for small municipalities.
The coe cient associated to the term MUit ⇥ Largeit is still negative but not statically
significant, thus indicating that the reduction in expenditure is not driven by the size of the
municipality. The results do not change in the matched sample.
In columns 2 and 4 of Table 4, we show the estimates of equation 5, separately for the
full and the matched samples. Focusing on column 2, we find that municipalities joining a
Union experience a significant decrease in municipal expenditure as long as the number in
the Union is lower (equal) to 9. However, the coe cient associated to the interaction term,
MUit ⇥ Unionsizeit, turns out to be not significant, thus suggesting that the reduction of
the municipal expenditure does not depend on the number of municipalities in the Union.
The results are qualitatively similar in the sample of matched municipalities, although less
24
precisely estimated (Table 4, col. 4).
PLACE TABLE 4 HERE
6.2 Robustness Checks
Reverse causality. In Table 5, we report the estimates for the homogeneous and heteroge-
neous duration models.21 It is evident that there is no reverse causality, because the e↵ect of
expenditure on the conditional probability to enter and/or form a Union is not significant.
We also notice that unobserved heterogeneity does not appear to be an issue. Indeed, the
coe cient of log expenditure is identical for both models, and the hypothesis of zero unob-
served heterogeneity fails to be rejected.
PLACE TABLE 5 HERE
Transfers. In Table 6, we report the results of the analysis, discussed in Section 5.2, which
controls for transfers and/or revenues collected by the municipal union. Columns 1 and 4
show, for comparison purposes, our benchmark estimates of equation 1 in the full sample
and in the matched sample, respectively.22 When we include, in equation 1, central, regional
and other transfers to the Union together with other revenues, the coe cient of municipal
union is highly statistically significant and slightly lower than the benchmark estimate (see
columns 1 and 2). In the matched sample we find identical e↵ects (see columns 4 and 5).
When we attribute the total amount of all transfers and revenues of the Unions to each mu-
nicipality, according to their population size, the e↵ect of participating in a municipal union
21For ease of interpretation we have expressed the estimated coe cient of the log expenditure variable as
a hazard ratio. Results are shown more extensively in Table A.4.
22Note that these coe cients are slightly di↵erent from those in columns 2 and 5 of Table 2, because to
keep the same sample size across all the analyses we are removing 9 municipal unions - 80 observations -
which budget data are not available for the the period 2002-2004.
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is still negative, highly significant, and generally in line with the estimates in the other spec-
ifications (see columns 3 and 6, in the full and matched sample respectively). These findings
are consistent with our main results, and thus indicate that transfers and own revenues of
the municipal union are unlikely to be a serious source of bias.
PLACE TABLE 6 HERE
Homogenous control group. As explained in Section 5.3, we refine our definition of
control group including more homogeneous municipalities and we re-estimate equation 1.
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that in the full sample the e↵ect of being in a municipal union
reduces expenditures by around 7 percent. In column 2, we report the same estimation in
the matched sample and the e↵ect is still significant at 1 percent but somewhat lower. We
also notice that the coe cient of municipal union is a bit larger compared to our benchmark
results in Table 2. However, taking into account the smaller sample size and the shorter time
period considered, the results of this analysis are, overall, confirming our previous findings.
PLACE TABLE 7 HERE
Alternative Region: Toscana. Our last robustness check deals with the possibility of
self-selection of the municipalities joining the Unions in Emilia Romagna. In Section 5.4 we
have illustrated our new approach based on the choice of municipalities and Unions, located
in an alternative region, Toscana, very similar and comparable to Emilia Romagna. We esti-
mate equation 1, both in the full and matched samples, using the same type of municipality
controls employed in the analyses for Emilia Romagna. The results are reported in Table 8.
In column 1, for the full sample, we observe that being in a municipal union in Toscana
reduces expenditures by 3.5 percent, the e↵ect is statically significant at 5 percent. When
we repeat the estimation in the sample of matched municipalities, the e↵ect is still negative
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although a bit smaller in magnitude (-2.6 percent) and significant at 10 percent. This test
confirms that participating in a municipal union has a clear expenditure saving e↵ect, and
this e↵ect is not limited to the Emilia Romagna region.
PLACE TABLE 8 HERE
7 ALTERNATIVE OUTPUT
In this section we investigate whether the inter-municipal cooperation is associated to a
real increase in the e ciency of the single municipalities. In fact, the expenditure savings
observed for municipalities in Union might be the consequence of a lower quality in the
provision of public services.
Furthermore, we also evaluate whether inter-municipal cooperation reduces local rev-
enues. This can occur because the expenditure savings generated by cooperation might be
used by local policy makers to reduce taxes, since it is politically attractive (Allers and
Geertsema, 2016).
7.1 Provision of Public Services
To verify whether the reduction of expenditure after joining a municipal union leads to a
decrease in the provision of local public services, we would need exact measures of the quan-
tity or quality of those services for the period 2001-2011. Unfortunately, such information
is not available. Hence, following the recent literature (Allers & Geertsema, 2016; Blesse &
Baskaran, 2016; Lima & Neto, 2018; Reingewertz, 2012), we consider three possible measures
of municipal attractiveness: per capita birth rate, net migration into municipality and per
capita primary school class size. If local services were to decline we would expect a nega-
tive impact of participating to Union on these measures, as a consequence of the reduction
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in expenditures. For example, poor local public services may imply lower migration, lower
birth rates could be a result of a reduced attractiveness of the municipality. Furthermore,
lower expenditures may increase the school class size, a typical indicator of the quality of
the school service.
Moreover, to evaluate whether the e ciency in the provision of local public services has
improved after joining a municipal union, we, first, collect data on the per-capita number
of road accidents. If a decrease in expenditure worsens roads or bridges maintenance, then
the number of car accidents might increase. Then, we build two indicators at the municipal
level. The first is given by the ratio between the number of houses served by the municipal
service of domicile waste collection and the total number of houses.23 This should be a signal
of the e ciency in waste collection. The second indicator is the ratio between the number
of successful applications at local kindergartens and the total number of applications. This
should capture the level of e ciency in the supply of kindergarten services.
The results of our estimations are reported in Table 9, for both the full sample and
the matched municipality sample. In Panel A we report the estimates obtained using the
measures of attractiveness. The e↵ect of joining a municipal union is always not statistically
significant, confirming that there is no decrease in municipality attractiveness. In Panel B
we show the results for the indicators of e ciency. We notice that, overall, participating
to a Union does not a↵ect the provision of public services. Indeed, all coe cients are not
significant except for kindergarten supply. In the latter case, we observe an increase in the
rate of successful applications of approximately 4 percent, both in the full sample and the
matched sample of municipalities.
Taken together, these results suggest that the inter-municipal cooperation is not associ-
ated to any reduction in the provision of public services, therefore all the obtained expendi-
ture savings may be interpreted as an e ciency gain.
23The domicile waste collection is not available for all houses and people are required to take their own
waste to specific collection points.
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PLACE TABLE 9 HERE
7.2 Local Revenues
In the analyses conducted so far, we have found that participating to a municipal union
reduces local expenditure, while maintaining unchanged (or at least not decreasing) the
provision of local services. However, municipalities might have used these savings to lower
tax rates.
In order to test this hypothesis, we have collected data on local tax revenues24 and used
as dependent variable (in per-capita term and transformed in logs) to re-estimate equation
1. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 10. Looking at column 1, for the full
sample, participating to a municipal union slightly reduces the local tax revenue by around
2.7 percent, and the e↵ect is statistically significant only at 10 percent. When considering
the matched sample, the e↵ect is still negative, and approximately of the same magnitude,
however it is not statistically significant. Therefore, we can conclude that taking part in a
municipal union might only marginally a↵ect local revenues.
PLACE TABLE 10 HERE
24The main local tax revenue is given by the property tax, ICI (Imposta comunale sugli immobili, now
renamed IMU, Imposta municipale unica), introduced in 1992 and applied to real estates. This tax is paid
every year by property owners directly to the municipality where the property is located. In particular,
the ICI tax base is the cadastral income, which does not vary over time (occasionally, cadastral values are
increased by the same proportion, so they do not change in relative terms). The tax is levied di↵erently on
owner-occupied dwellings (the dwellings where owners have their residence) and on other dwellings (rented
properties, secondary properties used for holidays, and so on): tax rates are lower on the former, and tax
credits are allowed only for the former. Other important tax revenue sources for municipalities are the tax
or tari↵ on urban waste disposal (Tarsu, now renamed Tari), and a surtax on the personal income levied by
the central government (Addizionale comunale Irpef).
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8 CONCLUSION
Inter-municipal cooperation is a widespread phenomenon among local governments, and it
is used by municipalities in order to provide local public services. However, we still know
very little about its e ciency. In this study we investigated whether this local form of
coordination has an impact on the level of per-capita expenditure of the single municipalities.
Each cooperating municipality can exploit economies of scale and internalise externalities,
and we test whether there are e ciency gains in terms of local expenditure reduction.
In particular, we analysed the Italian experience of municipal unions, using unique ad-
ministrative data on the municipalities belonging to the Emilia Romagna region, over the
period 2001-2011. We employed a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach combined with match-
ing models, and we found that participation to a Union reduces the total current per-capita
expenditures by around 5 percent, compared to municipalities not in a Union. The e↵ect
is persistent and increases up to six years from entrance. Moreover, by using measures of
municipality attractiveness and indicator of e ciency, we did not find any decrease in the
quality of local public services. Finally, our results are still confirmed when we repeat our
main analysis considering municipalities located in Toscana, a neighbouring region very sim-
ilar to Emilia Romagna. We can, therefore, conclude that the municipal union is an e↵ective
tool to increase municipalities e ciency.
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Figure 1: Emilia Romagna municipalities - 2001
Note: Municipalities and Municipal Unions in year 2001. Municipalities belonging to the same Municipal Union share the same color.
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Figure 2: Emilia Romagna municipalities - 2011
Note: Municipalities and Municipal Unions in year 2001. Municipalities belonging to the same Municipal Union share the same color.
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Table 1: Municipalities in Unions in Emilia Romagna 2001-2011
Year Municipal Unions Municipalities not in Unions Municipalities in Unions % of Municipalities in Unions Total Municipalities
2001 1 328 9 2.67 337
2002 5 314 23 6.82 337
2003 5 303 23 7.06 326
2004 6 305 32 9.50 337
2005 6 303 32 9.55 335
2006 10 277 52 15.81 329
2007 10 281 54 16.12 335
2008 13 266 70 20.83 336
2009 25 199 132 39.88 331
2010 29 193 150 43.73 343
2011 31 180 160 47.06 340
Table 2: E↵ect of the Union on Log Expenditures
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures
Full sample Matched sample Matchinga
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Municipal Union -0.065*** -0.044*** -0.028** -0.060*** -0.041*** -0.025**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Permanence -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006)




N 3686 3686 3686 3335 3335 3335 332
Year FE X X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Municipality controls X X X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Municipality controls: population, area p.c., young (5) and old population ( 65),
1/population, income, election, taxpayers.
a Kernel di↵erence in di↵erences matching. Control group: municipalities never in Union.
Treatment group: municipalities that joined a Union in 2009. Sample size restricted to 2008 and 2010,
i.e. years before and after the entrance into a Union.
Table 3: Permanence in the municipal union
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures - 2001-2011
Full sample Matched sample N. Municipalities
(1) (2) (3)
1 year -0.043*** -0.039*** 160
(0.012) (0.013)
2 years -0.055*** -0.050*** 150
(0.014) (0.014)
3 years -0.064*** -0.058*** 132
( 0.017) ( 0.017)
4 years -0.069*** -0.062*** 70
( 0.019) ( 0.020)
5 years -0.072*** -0.063*** 54
(0.022) (0.022)
6 years -0.072*** -0.060*** 52
(0.024) ( 0.025)
7 years -0.068** -0.055** 32
(0.027) (0.027)
8 years -0.062** -0.046 32
(0.029) (0.030)
9 years -0.053* -0.033 23
(0.032) (0.032)
10 years -0.040 -0.017 23
( 0.035) ( 0.035)
11 years -0.025 0.002 9
(0.038) (0.038)
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
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Table 4: E↵ect of the Union by municipality size
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Municipal Union -0.034** -0.052* -0.034** -0.046
(0.017) (0.030) (0.017) (0.031)




Municipal Union ⇥ Union size 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
N 3686 3686 3335 3335
Year FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality controls X X X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Large: municipality population   8000 inhabitants.
Union size: number of municipalities in Union.
Municipality controls: see Table 2.
Table 5: Estimates of the e↵ect of the expenditures on the probability to join the union
Duration Models
Dependent variable: Municipal Union
Homogenous Heterogenous
Coe↵. s.e Hazard LogL Coe↵. s.e Hazard LogL P-val⇤
Ratio Ratio
Log expenditures -0.317 (0.330) 0.729 -473.537 -0.317 (0.330) 0.729 -473.537 0.496
⇤LR test of model with Normal distributed heterogeneity against model without controlling for heterogeneity.
All models contain municipality controls: see Table 2.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
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Table 6: E↵ect of the Union including Transfers
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Union -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.050***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
State grants 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Regional grants 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Other bodies grants 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Other Revenues -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Union revenues by municipalities 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
N 3606 3606 3606 3255 3255 3255
Year and Municipality FE X X X X X X
Municipality controls X X X X X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Municipality controls: see Table 2.
Table 7: More homogeneous control groups
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures - 2001-2008
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2)
Municipal Union -0.069*** -0.066***
(0.018) (0.018)
N 1217 1138
Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
Municipality controls X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Control group includes future treated.
Municipality controls: see Table 2.
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Table 8: E↵ect of Municipal Union in Toscana
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2)
Municipal Union -0.035** -0.026*
(0.015) (0.016)
N 2893 2475
Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
Municipality controls X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Municipality controls: similar as those used
for Emilia Romagna see Table 2.
45
Table 9: E↵ect of the Union on alternative output
Panel A: Attractiveness
Full sample Matched sample
Birth rate Number of Net Birth Number of Net
p.c. children Migration rate p.c. children migration
enrolled enrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Union 0.000 0.000 -3.877 0.000 0.000 -2.124
(0.000) (0.000) (7.382) (0.000) (0.000) (6.523)
N 3686 2351 3686 3335 2123 3335
Panel B: E ciency of local services
Full sample Matched sample
Road Kindergarten Waste Road Kindergarten Waste
crash p.c. supply collection crash p.c. supply collection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Union -0.000 4.303*** 1.862 -0.000 4.318*** 1.760
(0.000) (1.563) (1.441) (0.000) (1.584) (1.441)
N 3592 2120 2326 3265 1972 2113
Year and Municipality FE X X X X X X
Municipality controls X X X X X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level. Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Municipality controls: see Table 2.
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Table 10: E↵ect of Municipal Union on Local Tax Revenue
Dependent variable: Local Tax Revenue
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2)
Municipal Union -0.027* -0.021
(0.014) (0.014)
N 3686 3335
Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
Municipality controls X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.




Table A.1: Data sources
Variable Definition and measure Available from-to Source
Log expenditure Log of current expenditure per resident; 2011 Euros 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Municipal Union Dummy variable that takes on the value one if municipality i
at time t belongs to a Municipal Union and zero otherwise. 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Birth rate per capita Birth rate per capita 2001-2011 ISTAT
Number of children enrolled Number of children enrolled in infant school (per-capita) 2004-2011 ISTAT
Net migration Di↵erence between new registered members and unregistered members 2001-2011 ISTAT
Per capita road crash Number of accidents within the municipal roads 2001-2011 ISTAT
Taxpayers Share of the taxpayers of the municipality 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Economy, Department of Finance
Population Population of the municipality 2001-2011 ISTAT
Population 5 Share of the population aged between 0-5 2001-2011 ISTAT
Population 65 Share of the population over the age of 65 2001-2011 ISTAT
Area per capita Area (square kilometers) divided by numbers of citizens per area 2001-2011 Our computation
Income Real personal income tax base per resident; 2011 Euros 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Economy, Department of Finance
1/population Inverse of the population 2001-2011 Our computation
Permanence Number of years joining the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Our computation
Election Dummy variable that takes the value of one
if municipality i at time t has an election and zero otherwise 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Kindergarden supply Number of applications submitted to the kindergarten / number of satisfied applications 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Waste collection Number of houses served by the domicile municipal service of waste collection/ total number of houses 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Log Local Tax revenues Log of revenues of local taxes per resident; 2011 Euros 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
State grants Grants from the State to the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Regional grants Grants from the Region Emilia Romagna to the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Other bodies grants Grants from other body (municipalities and provinces) to the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Other Revenues Other revenues of the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Union revenues by municipalities Total revenues of the municipal Union divided by municipalities 2001-2011 Italian Ministry of Interior
Large Dummy variable that takes the value of one
if a municipality i at time t has more than 8000 inhabitants and zero otherwise 2001-2011 ISTAT
Union size number of municipalities forming a given Municipal Union 2001-2011 Our computation
Permanence square Square of number of years joining the Municipal Union 2001-2011 Our computation
Seismic area Dummy variable equals to 1 if the municipality is located in a seismic zone 2001 ISTAT
Rural area Dummy variable equals to 1 if the municipality is a rural municipality and zero otherwise.
Rural communities are defined as municipalities that meet the definition of Eurostat:
population density (population per kmq) less than 100 inhabitants per square kilometer
or % of employed in agriculture above the Community average. 2001 ISTAT
Altitude profile Categorical variable equal to 1 if the municipality is located in plain,
equal to 2 if the municipality is located on hills,
and equal to 3 if the municipality is located in mountains; municipal unemployment rate 2001 ISTAT
Unemployment Municipal unemployment rate 2001 ISTAT
Dwellings Number of houses 2001 ISTAT
Firms Number of firms 2001 ISTAT
Debts Municipal debts in per capita term 2001 Italian Ministry of Interior
Table A.2: Municipalities in Unions in Emilia Romagna 2001-2011
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log expenditure 3,686 6.66 0.29 5.73 8.33
Municipal Union 3,686 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Population 3,686 11,419.58 23,150.21 91.00 186,690.00
Population  5 3,686 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.08
Population   65 3,686 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.64
Income 3,686 13,223.43 2,086.34 5,425.24 20,525.25
Area (per capita) 3,686 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.27
Taxpayers 3,686 0.71 0.10 0.32 1.08
1/population 3,686 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Election 3,686 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Permanence 3,686 0.60 1.82 0.00 15.00
Permanence square 3,686 3.67 16.80 0.00 225.00
Birth rate per capita 3,686 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
N. children in infant school pc 2,351 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
Net migration 3,686 42.33 122.74 -1,773.00 1,366.00
Per capita road car crash 3,592 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Kindergarten supply 2,120 80.84 18.11 0.00 100.00
Waste collection 2,326 84.15 22.40 0.00 100.00
Log local tax revenue 3,686 6.13 0.33 4.50 7.18
State grants 3,606 0.84 5.39 0.00 120.77
Regional grants 3,606 3.81 16.80 0.00 259.33
Other bodies grants 3,606 12.58 46.82 0.00 378.10
Other Revenues 3,606 7.37 27.10 0.00 292.26
Union revenues by municipalities 3,606 24.61 83.61 0.00 676.55
Large 3,686 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Union size 3,686 1.28 2.80 0.00 10.00
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Table A.3: Propensity score model of participation to a Municipal Union
Probit Model

















Population  5 50.798***
(15.234)













Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
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Table A.4: Estimates of the e↵ect of the expenditures on the probability to join the union -
Full model
Duration Models
Dependent variable: Municipal Union
Homogenous Heterogenous
(1) (2)




Population  5 47.285*** 47.278***
(14.715) (14.715)
















All models include dummy variables for each period.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
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Table A.5: Evaluation of the common trend
Dependent variable: Log Expenditures
Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Municipal Union -0.046*** -0.025*** -0.044*** -0.025***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
leadt+1 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
leadt+2 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
leadt+3 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.008





N 3686 3686 3335 3335
Year FE X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X
Municipality controls X X X X
Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Significance levels: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%.
Municipality controls: see Table 2.
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